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CIVIL RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
During this survey term the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals again con-
sidered a large number of appeals arising from actions brought under federal
civil rights statutes. One area of controversy treated by this survey was cre-
ated when two Tenth Circuit panels, hearing cases brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 adopted inconsistent approaches towards
evaluating the evidentiary effect of proof that a minority candidate has bet-
ter objective qualifications than a selected applicant. Another employment
discrimination opinion covered by this survey examined the use of statistical
evidence to establish a pattern of discrimination.
The majority of civil rights appeals analyzed here, however, relate to
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Section 1983 provides a civil rem-
edy for persons suffering deprivations of federally protected rights through
actions taken under color of state law. 3 Several Tenth Circuit opinions ana-
lyzed in this section involve the question of when an ostensibly private
party's joint participation with a state or municipal entity constitutes action
taken under color of state law. Other section 1983 issues surveyed include
immunity for municipal officials, prisoner's rights, the propriety of awarding
a section 1983 plaintiff nominal damages, "special circumstances" which will
preclude an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a section 1983
action, and due process claims.
I. EFFECT OF PROVING A MINORITY CANDIDATE'S OBJECTIVELY
SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS IN A TITLE VII ACTION
A. Mohammed v. Callaway: Rebuttal of an Employer's Subjective
JusizVcations through Proof of Objectively Superior ualfatons
In Mohammed v. Callaway4 the plaintiff, a Hispanic civilian employee of
the Army, applied for a supervisor's position in response to a posted job va-
cancy.5 The announcement listed specific job qualifications, which the
plaintiff possessed.6 The stipulated facts established that the job opening
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the Jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id
3. See id.
4. 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1983).
5. Id at 396.
6. Id
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was withdrawn, and less than a year later the Army posted a similar open-
ing 7 with relaxed job qualifications.8  Dyer, the non-minority applicant
hired for the job, did not possess the original job qualifications,9 nor did he
possess the technical qualifications required for the revised position.' 0 Nev-
ertheless, Dyer was hired over Mohammed and two other applicants because
of Dyer's "experience, education, ability, dedication, and enthusiasm."''I Af-
ter Mohammed brought an administrative complaint alleging procedural ir-
regularities in the selection process, the Army ordered a new selection based
on an ostensibly objective "Ranking Guide."' 2 When Dyer was selected
again, Mohammed brought suit against the Army alleging discrimination
under Title VII. 13 Following a bench trial, the district court held that Mo-
hammed was not entitled to relief on two grounds. First, he had failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.' 4 Second, even if a prima
facie case had been established, the evidence showed that the Army had
chosen between two "amply" qualified candidates on the basis of legitimate
business reasons.' 5
1. Elements of a Prima Facie Claim of Promotion Discrimination
The trial court formulated the elements of a prima facie case of promo-
tion discrimination as "1) qualified applicant; 2) racial minority; 3) unsuc-
cessful application for existing vacancy; and 4) employer continuing to seek
further applicants."' 16 This formulation precisely paralleled that of the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 17 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected the trial court's formulation, pointing out that in promotion discrimi-
nation, as opposed to hiring discrimination, the sought after position will
usually be filled following rejection of the minority's application.' 8 Noting
that the Court in McDonnell Douglas had explicitly recognized that the ele-
ments of a prima facie case of employment discrimination will vary with the
7. The evidence indicated that the two positions were identical, although this question
was the subject of conflicting testimony. Set id at 396-97 & n.I.
8. Originally, the position in dispute was at a grade level GS-13; the position was down-
graded to GS-12 the second time it was posted. Mohammed and two other finalists could have
qualified at the GS-13 level, while the applicant selected for the position could not have quali-
fied at that level. Id at 397.
9. Id
10. Id. at 400.
11. Id at 397.
12. Id. at 398.
13. Title VII of the 1969 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1976 & Supp. V
1981). See 698 F.2d at 398.
14. 698 F.2d at 398.
15. Id at 399.
16. Id at 398.
17. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). McDonnell Douglas held that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in hiring is established when a plaintiff's evidence shows that he or she belongs to a pro-
tected class; that he or she, while qualified for an open position, applied for that position; that
he or she was rejected for the position in spite of being qualified; and that the employer contin-
ued to seek qualified applicants following rejection of the plaintiff. Id "Protected classes" em-
brace classes based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1976).
18. See 698 F.2d at 398.
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nature of the alleged discriminatory act, 19 the Tenth Circuit held that a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of promotion discrimination by prov-
ing that the first three McDonnell Douglas criteria are present 20 and then
showing that the position has been filled by another applicant. 2 1 Because
Mohammed's evidence satisfied this test, the Tenth Circuit held that a
prima facie case of employment discrimination was established as a matter
of law.
22
2. Subjective Hiring Criteria as Proof of Discriminatory Intent in
Light of a Minority Candidate's Objectively Superior
Qualifications
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is shown, the burden of pro-
duction 23 shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate business
reason for its prima facie discriminatory practice. 24 The employer meets this
burden by articulating a nondiscriminatory justification for its hiring deci-
sion. 25 The plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the employer's alleged reasons for rejecting the applica-
tion were only a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 26 The employee can
satisfy this burden by showing that a discriminatory intent in fact motivated
the employer's decision, or by offering evidence showing that the proffered
justification is unbelievable.
27
The district court in Mohammed found that the evidence showed that
Mohammed and Dyer were both "amply" qualified.2 8 In that context, sub-
jective considerations were accepted as a legitimate business reason support-
ing the Army's selection of Dyer.2 9 The district court then concluded that
Mohammed had not shown that the proffered reasons were mere pretext, 30
and accordingly held that the Army had not intentionally discriminated in
violation of Title VII.
3 1
After reviewing the entire record, the Tenth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, 32 and that the district
court had applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating the employer's
explanations. 33 The record showed that the candidate selected was not "am-
19. Id (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)).
20. See supra note 17.
21. 698 F.2d at 398 (quoting Mortenson v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 823 (10th Cir. 1982)).
22. 698 F.2d at 398.
23. The employee retains the burden of persuasion throughout a Title VII action. Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The prima facie case entitles an employee to judg-
ment if the employer fails to come forward with a legitimate business reason. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254.
25. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
26. Id at 256.
27. Id
28. 698 F.2d at 399.
29. Ste id at 400-01.
30. Id. at 399.
31. See id. at 396.
32. See id at 401.
33. See td.
1984]
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ply" qualified. 34 More importantly, the record showed that the candidates
were not equal qualified:35 specific qualifications placed in the job an-
nouncement were met by Mohammed, but not by Dyer.36 The Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that a candidate meeting the specific requirements in a job
announcement is objectively more qualified than one who does not meet the
stated requirements. 37 Although an employer retains discretion to choose
between equally qualified candidates on the basis of nondiscriminatory, sub-
jective criteria,38 the use of those criteria when candidates are not equally
qualified substantially diminishes the credibility of the employer's justifica-
tion for using subjective criteria as the ultimate basis of its decision. 39 Given
the inferences of discriminatory intent arising from the totality of the Army's
conduct,' the Tenth Circuit found that the Army had engaged in inten-
tional discrimination and accordingly reversed the lower court.
3. Summary
Three significant principles for proving employment discrimination re-
sult from Mohammed. First, the elements of a prima facie case of employment
discrimination are flexible. 4i Second, a critical determination in assessing
whether applicants are equally qualified is the match between an applicant's
credentials and posted job requirements. 4 2 Third, a strong inference of in-
tentional discrimination arises when an employer uses subjective factors to
justify the rejection of a minority candidate who is objectively better quali-






38. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (quoted in
Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 401).
39. See 698 F.2d at 401. Adams v. Gaudet, 515 F. Supp. 1086 (W.D.La. 1981) held that
unless a selected applicant is objectively more qualified than a rejected minority applicant, the
employer does not rebut the prima facie case by explaining that its hiring decision was based on
an employer's prerogative to make a discretionary selection. Id. at 1097-98 (citing Burdine, 450
U.S. at 259). Mohammed cites Gauder for the proposition that use of subjective criteria in re-
jecting a better qualified minority candidate is indicative of discriminatory intent. 698 F.2d at
399. Mohammed, however, did not adopt Gaudetr's categorical rejection of the power of a discre-
tion-based explanation to rebut a prima facie case when an objectively better qualified minority
applicant has been rejected. See id. at 401.
40. The court observed that, in addition to reliance on subjective considerations, the Army
had engaged in inexplicable procedural irregularities in filling the position in question, had
adopted but not implemented an affirmative action program, and had never permitted a minor-
ity to hold a supervisory position in the division encompassing the disputed position. 698 F.2d
at 401.
41. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045
(10th Cir. 1981)(subjective decision-making creates inference of discriminatory intent where ap-
plicant's protected class is significantly under-represented). In another twist on the use of sub-
jective qualifications, the Tenth Circuit recently held that failure to meet an employer's
subjective criteria could not defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case. Burrus v. United Telephone
Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 491 (1982).
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B. Verniero v. Air Force Academy School District # 20: The Insignificance
of Superior Objecive Qualiications
Three months after Mohammed, a different Tenth Circuit panel ad-
dressed another case involving a similar set of facts, but reached its result by
using an analysis inconsistent with that of Mohammed. In Verniero v. 4ir Force
Academy School District #20, 4" the plaintiff, a female, applied for two job
vacancies within School District #20: elementary school principal and di-
rector of special education.45 The school district had posted a vacancy no-
tice for the elementary school principal position listing three job
requirements: 1) three years experience in public schools, 2) master's degree
or equivalent, and 3) a Type D administrative certificate. 46 Although the
plaintiff undisputably met all three requirements, a male applicant who pos-
sessed only two of the qualifications47 was selected over Verniero, allegedly
on the basis of certain subjective factors. 48 The job announcement for the
position of Director of Special Education listed three years experience in spe-
cial education and a Type D or special education endorsement as the re-
quired qualifications. 49 Although the plaintiff was admittedly qualified, a
male applicant was hired.50 Verniero then brought suit alleging sex discrim-
ination under Title VII.
Following a bench trial, the district court found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination, that the defendant had ar-
ticulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's non-selection;
and that plaintiff had been unable to show the proffered reasons were pre-
text, or were overshadowed by unarticulated discriminatory purposes.
5i
Thus, plaintiff failed to carry her ultimate burden of proving that she was
the victim of intentional sex discrimination.
52
Verniero appealed to the Tenth Circuit on three grounds. First, she
argued that the district court failed to give due weight to the fact that she
had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 53 Second, she argued
that the court failed to evaluate the school board's use of subjective criteria
in its selection process as a possible pretext for sex discrimination.5 4 Finally,
Verniero argued that the trial court failed to recognize that waiver of the
Type D certificate after it had been listed as a job qualification indicated
44. 705 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id
47. The male applicant, who came from outside the state, did not possess the required
Type D Administrative Certificate. Id at 390.
48. Id at 392. The School District presented evidence that it preferred an out-of-state
person, and that certification requirements had been waived for other out-of-state persons "in
certain circumstances." Id
49. Id at 390.
50. Id
51. Id; cf. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (plaintiff may demonstrate employer's justification was
not basis for selection decision by showing that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or . . . by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence").
52. 705 F.2d at 392.




that the district's reasons for failing to hire her were pretextual. 55
Judge Barrett, writing for the Tenth Circuit over Judge McKay's dis-
sent, found the plaintiffs first argument to be without merit.56 Judge Bar-
rett stated that when the trial court properly found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case, it correctly shifted the burden to the defend-
ant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying the posi-
tion to the plaintiff.5 7 Because this was the proper treatment of a prima
facie case, plaintiff's first ground for appeal did not justify reversal.
The plaintiffs next contention was essentially that the pervasive subjec-
tivity of the articulated basis for the Board's decision precluded a finding
that the Board had not consciously or unconsciously discriminated in the
hiring process.58 While acknowledging that a decision based on subjective
opinions of a candidate's qualifications entitles a plaintiff "to the benefit of
an inference of discrimination, ' 59 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the subjective factors used by the district, such as the
quality of an employee's work experience or the employee's ability to get
along with others, were legitimate reasons for selecting one applicant over
another.60 Because the defendant had articulated legitimate reasons for the
plaintiff's non-selection, plaintiff was required to show that the ostensibly
legitimate reasons merely shrouded the employer's true discriminatory mo-
tive. 6 Deferring to the trial court's findings, the Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff had not shown that the school district's justifications were merely
pretextual.
62
Plaintiff's third argument, that the defendant's waiver of the Type D
certificate after listing it as a job qualification demonstrated that the Board's
justifications for its hiring decision were merely pretextual, was also re-
jected.63 Testimony indicated that the certificate requirements had been
waived for non-residents in certain circumstances in the past, and that the
Board preferred a non-resident for the position.64 Once again, the court re-
fused to reverse the trial court's finding that the defendant had acted for its
stated, legitimate reasons and without discriminatory intent.
65
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs contention that remarks of the trial
judge demonstrating distaste for discrimination suits justified a new trial.
Although the majority found the remarks "misplaced," it viewed them as
55. Id. at 391.
56. Id
57. Id The purpose of the prima facie case is to ensure that the employment decision did
not result from a simple lack of qualifications or lack of a job opening. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). The prima facie case essentially
serves to identify a case as one having an inherent likelihood of discrimination, thus requiring
the presentation of substantive evidence of non-discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56.
58. See 705 F.2d at 391.
59. Id (citing Burrus v. United Telephone Co., 638 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982)).
60. 705 F.2d at 392.
61. Id See also Burdne, 450 U.S. at 256.
62. 705 F.2d at 391.







In a persuasive dissent, Judge McKay stressed that the majority erred
by failing to engage in the method of analysis set forth in Mohammed.6 7 In
Mohammed the Tenth Circuit emphasized that when an employer rejects a
minority candidate on the basis of employer discretion (i.e. on the basis of
subjective factors), the crucial determination is whether the candidate se-
lected is as objectively qualified as the minority candidate. 68 Incident to this
inquiry, Mohammed held that candidates meeting the specific requirements in
a job announcement are objectively better qualified than those who do
not, 69 and that once the bypassed minority employee establishes superior
objective qualifications the factfinder must consider the inference of discrim-
inatory intent which results from the decision to use subjective, rather than
objective, criteria. 70  Similarly, Mohammed confirmed that employer use of
subjective factors to justify rejection of a minority candidate generally sup-
ports an inference of discriminatory intent or pretext. 7 1 Judge McKay
would have remanded because the Verntero trial court failed to consider the
relative objective qualifications of plaintiff and the successful candidate, and
because the trial court's findings failed to give due weight to the strong infer-
ence of discriminatory intent arising from the employer's ultimate reliance
on subjective hiring criteria.
72
Judge McKay also dissented from the majority's treatment of the trial
judge's disparaging remarks. Noting that judges must disqualify themselves
if their impartiality towards a particular case could be reasonably ques-
tioned,73 Judge McKay felt that the trial judge's remarks clearly demon-
strated a prejudicial lack of impartiality which, in conjunction with the
failure to follow Mohammed, mandated a new trial.
74
C. The Conflict Created by Mohammed and Verniero
One possible explanation for the difference in the appellate treatment of
Mohammed and Vermiero is the different nature of the disputed positions. The
supervisory position in Mohammed was technically oriented, rendering subjec-
tive factors of little relevance in the hiring decision. Given the technical
orientation of the position, the applicant meeting the posted requirements is
clearly the better qualified candidate. Conversely, in school staff administra-
tive positions, like those in Vernerio, subjective factors, such as the ability to
66. Id. at 393. Prior to entering his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial judge
questioned the reasons why anyone would serve as a school board member in light of the liabil-
ity for civil rights violations, and stated that the only way a board member could be absolutely
sure of avoiding discrimination cases is by hiring "only handicapped females having as grand-
parents a Black, a Chicano, an American Indian and an Oriental, who is over 50 years of age."
Id at 393 n.2.
67. Id. at 393 (McKay, J., dissenting).
68. Id. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 40. See also Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 401.
72. 705 F.2d at 394 (McKay, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 394 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(1982)).
74. 705 F.2d at 395 (McKay, J., dissenting).
1984]
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work with others, would be of greater importance. The Vernerto court did
not, however, attempt to articulate such a distinction. As a result, trial
courts lack guidance on whether, and to what extent, Mohammed's objective-
criteria based analysis is controlling.
75
II. THE USE OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
During the survey term, the Tenth Circuit examined the admissibility
of statistical evidence to rebut an employer's reason for rejecting a minority
applicant. In Anderson v. City of Albuquerque76 the plaintiff, while employed by
the City of Albuquerque, learned that the staff director for the Human
Rights Board was planning to resign and applied for the position. 7 7 Ander-
son then voluntarily left her job with the city to accept a position elsewhere,
but did not withdraw her application for the staff director position. 78 Upon
learning that a male Hispanic was appointed to the position, Anderson insti-
tuted a class action under Title VII claiming illegal sex discrimination.
79
The trial court dismissed the class action, held the staff director's position
was exempt from Title VII, and dismissed Anderson's claim on the merits.
8 0
Anderson then appealed, contending that the court erroneously denied her
standing to maintain the class action, 8' erroneously ruled the position was
exempt,8 2 and erroneously failed to admit and consider statistical evidence
she offered to rebut the employer's articulated legitimate business reason for
its selection of another candidate.8 3 The Tenth Circuit, over Chief Judge
Seth's dissent, agreed with all of plaintiff's contentions.
8 4
A. Class Action Standing for Voluntarily Terminated Employee
The trial court ruled that the Tenth Circuit's Hernandez v. Gray8 5 deci-
sion precluded finding that plaintiff had standing to maintain a class action
representing past, present, and future female city employees. 86 Hernandez
held that former employees who had voluntarily terminated their employ-
ment could not maintain a class action based on allegations of discrimina-
75. Further confusion stems from Mohammed itself. The court noted that an Army witness
had testified that specific qualifications were listed in job announcements for the express pur-
pose of obtaining the best qualified personnel. 698 F.2d at 400. The court stated that "[tlhe
only reasonable inference to be drawn from thit evidence is that a candidate who meets the spe-
cific requirements in the job announcement is better qualified than one who must resort to
alternative criteria." Id (emphasis supplied). Thus it is unclear whether a candidate meeting
posted qualifications will automatically be deemed more objectively qualified, or whether em-
ployer testimony concerning the purpose of specific requirements will be necessary in order to
establish the superior objective qualifications of one matching posted requirements.
76. 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1982).





82. Id. at 800.
83. Id at 802.
84. See id at 803.
85. 530 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1976).
86. 690 F 2d at 799.
[Vol. 61:2
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tion towards existing employees.8 7 The reason for this holding was that the
voluntary ex-employees did not allege they were past victims of the alleged
discriminatory practice, nor did they allege they were presently victims of
the employer's discrimination.88 Thus, they were not representatives of the
putative class, and had no standing to maintain an action on behalf of the
class.8 9
Unlike the trial court, the Tenth Circuit found Hernandez distinguish-
able from Anderson .9 The court noted that Anderson had maintained an
employment application despite her voluntary termination; thus, Anderson
remained a member of the class subject to the employer's alleged hiring dis-
crimination and had standing to maintain the class action.9 1 The court also
noted that the district court had erred to the extent it premised its denial of
class certification on the merits of plaintiffs claim.
92
B. Title VI Exemption
Title VII exempts certain governmental advisory/policy making posi-
tions from the its antidiscrimination strictures. 93 The Tenth Circuit stated
that, in any event, this exemption must be narrowly construed. 94 Examining
the evidence detailing the staff director's actual advisory functions, the court
concluded that the staff director was not a policy making employee, was not
on an elected official's staff, and was not a legal advisor to an elected offi-
cial. 95 Hence, even though the staff director position was not subject to civil
service laws, it did not fall within the claimed exemption.
96
C. Use of Statistical Evidence to Demonstrate Discri'minalory Intent
The Tenth Circuit also reversed and remanded the case to the district
court with directions to admit excluded statistical evidence, 9 7 and then to re-
evaluate the evidence and make findings in terms of the three-step presenta-
tion of proof analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas.98 The court noted that
87. Hernandez v. Gray, 530 F.2d 858, 859 (10th Cir. 1976).
88. Id
89. Id
90. Anderson, 690 F.2d at 799.
91. Id
92. Id
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(0(1976). This section provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State
or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the consti-
tutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sen-
tence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
Id
94. 690 F.2d at 800.
95. Id at 800-01.
96. Id. at 801.
97. Id. at 803.
98. Id The method of proof required by McDonnetll Douglas is: 1) plaintiff establishes prima
facie case; 2) employer articulates legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision;
and 3) plaintiff presents evidence showing employer's actual motivation was discriminatory ani-
19841
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because upper level jobs are often filled on the basis of subjective factors,
statistical evidence of the employer's overall hiring practices becomes espe-
cially significant.99 Although the trial court had admitted statistical evi-
dence relating to the city's general female hiring practices, those statistics did
not examine hiring of females as professionals or as department heads.10 0
When plaintiff attempted to inquire about those statistics, defense objections
were made and sustained. 10 1 Given the significance of statistics concerning
professionals and department heads to plaintiffs claim, and the Supreme
Court's explicit approval of the use of statistics to rebut an employer's prof-
fered legitimate reasons for its hiring decision,'0 2 the Tenth Circuit held that
Anderson had been denied a fair trial 10 3 and ordered a new trial including
the excluded statistical evidence.' 0 4 As noted, the majority also instructed
the trial court to make its findings of fact in a manner reflecting its consider-
ation of the McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis. 
0 5
D. The Dissent
Chief Judge Seth dissented from the majority's ruling on plaintiff's class
action claim, 10 6 its ruling on the exclusion of statistical evidence,'0 7 and its
ruling requiring the trial court to make findings of fact explicitly tracing the
McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis.'0 8 The dissent reasoned that the
plaintiff had been discriminated against (if at all) only for a nonclassified
supervisory position, precluding her from being considered a representative
of a class including all female city employees.' 0 9 Further, because a class
including all future female city employees was "really not a description of a
class at all,"" 10 the class action claim should have been rejected for failure to
identify a true class."'1 Similarly, Chief Judge Seth would have upheld the
trial court's rejection of plaintiffs "statistical evidence" concerning profes-
sional employment because the lack of any supporting data made the evi-
dence meaningless."' 2 Finally, the dissent found no support in Supreme
Court rulings or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for requiring the trial
court to present its findings in a manner exactly paralleling that of the Mc-
mus rather than the proffered legitimate justification. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
99. 690 F.2d at 802 (citing Bartholet, Apphcation of Title VIIftoobs in High Places, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 947 (1982)).
100. 690 F.2d at 802.
101. Id.
102. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
103. 690 F.2d at 803 (citing Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 833 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977)).
104. 690 F.2d at 803.
105. Id
106. Id at 804 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id at 805.
109. Id. at 804.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 805.
112. Chief Judge Seth noted that the plaintiff offered no evidence relating the numbers of
female professionals or department heads to the labor market, the number of applicants, or
"anything else which would make the numbers relevant." Id at 804.
[Vol. 61:2
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Donnell Douglas evidentiary scheme. t
13
III. SECTION 1983: DUE PROCESS AND THE DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
The fourteenth amendment 1 4 entitles a person to protection of prop-
erty rights against state interference without due process of law. 1 5 Persons
acting under color of state law who interfere with this fundamental protec-
tion without due process of law are subject to a federal civil rights action
under section 1983.116 This section surveys several Tenth Circuit decisions
involving property rights and section 1983 claims.
A. Requirement of Notice Prior to Sale of Property
McKee v. Heggy 117 began with McKee's arrest for kidnapping.1 18 While
searching McKee's car the police found what they thought was marijuana
and, consequently, seized the car as potential evidence. 19 Two weeks later,
after deciding against using the car as evidence, the police treated the car as
abandoned and sold it at a public auction without directly notifying the
plaintiff.120 Alleging that the police knew he was an interested party and
had failed to notify him of the sale, McKee brought a section 1983 action
claiming that he was deprived of a property interest without due process of
law when the police sold his car.' 2 ' Deciding the merits of the section 1983
claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and
the police chief on the basis that the notice provided through police compli-
ance with Oklahoma's abandonment statute
122 satisfied due process. 123
In light of the fact that the plaintiffs car was seized and not abandoned,
the Tenth Circuit held that compliance with the Oklahoma abandonment
statute's notice procedures was irrelevant.' 24 The court then assessed the
adequacy of the notice provided against the standard announced in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. :125 notice reasonably calculated to reach
113. Id. at 805.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental ac-
tions which deprive "any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id
115. Id. The traditional forms of possessory interests in real and personal property clearly
fall within the fourteenth amendment's definition of property. Eg., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972). Since the 1972 decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the four-
teenth amendment's definition of property has been extended by the concept of "entitlement."
This concept includes interests, such as governmental benefits, which are unlike traditional
property but which are entitled to fourteenth amendment protection because persons justifiably
rely on the continued existence of those benefits. Id at 577. Seegenerally Monaghan, Of"Liberty"
and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977).
116. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 927 & n.18 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
117. 703 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1983).
118. Id at 480.
119. Id
120. Id. at 481.
121. Id. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434(1982).
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 908 (1981). This statute provides for notice to an abandoned
car's registered owner, id. § 908(l), and also requires public notice of a proposed sale. Id.
123. 703 F.2d at 481.
124. Id. at 482.
125. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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all interested parties in time to afford them a reasonable opportunity to be
heard.' 26 The court of appeals found that the posted notice given by the
police was not "reasonably calculated" to inform the plaintiff of the sale
127
and thus did not afford him an adequate opportunity to present his objec-
tions. 128 Therefore, McKee was deprived of a property interest without be-
ing afforded due process of law. 129 The court also noted that because the
sale was not explicitly authorized by statute or rule, McKee would have to
prove that the sale was pursuant to the department's customary informal
procedure in order to establish action under color of state law.
130
B. Salzs fzg Due Process Through Providing A Post-deprivation Tort Remedy
The Supreme Court, in Parratt v. Taylor,131 held that a prisoner is de-
prived of property under color of state law when prison personnel negli-
gently lose or destroy a prisoner's property.' 32 Parrait further held that due
process is not violated by deprivation of property simpliciter; rather, there
needed to be a shortcoming in the state procedures which resulted in inade-
quate procedural protection of the prisoner's property interest.' 33 Hence,
due process is satisfied if circumstances preclude providing a prisoner with
meaningful predeprivation process and the state provides a meaningful post-
deprivation remedy. 1
34
In Wizams v. Morris 135 the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action alleg-
ing that because prison employees had negligently lost his property, which
had been stored in the prison during his incarceration, he had been deprived
of property without due process. 136 The district court dismissed Williams'
suit as frivolous because, although the state could not have predicted the
negligent loss of plaintiff's property and therefore could not have provided a
meaningful predeprivation hearing, the state had provided a meaningful
post-deprivation remedy through a state prison grievance procedure.
13 7
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but differed
with the district court's analysis of the source of Williams' meaningful post-
deprivation remedy. The court noted that the prison grievance procedure
could only afford partial relief, perhaps unconstitutionally, because it did
126. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court stated that provision for a hearing satisfies due process
only when notice is given which is "reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." d. See 703 F.2d at 482.
127. 703 F.2d at 482. The Oklahoma City Police Department knew McKee was an inter-
ested party because he had informed an interrogating police officer that the car was his, and
because his parents and lawyer had repeatedly inquired about the car at the police station. Id
128. Id. at 482.
129. Id
130. Id. at 482-83.
131. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
132. Id. at 536-37.
133. See id. at 537-41.
134. Id
135. 697 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 1350.
137. 697 F.2d at 1351.
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not provide a prisoner a chance to prove his entire loss.138 Turning to state
tort law as a source of post-deprivation relief, the court of appeals acknowl-
edged that although the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 139 precluded an
action against the state, the warden, or other supervisors, Williams could
proceed against those prison employees whose alleged negligence caused his
claimed loss.' 40 Because the state, via its tort law, provided Williams with a
post-deprivation remedy providing the possibility of full compensation for
his alleged loss, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Wil-
liams' section 1983 claim.
14 1
C. Due Process Considerations in Terminatn1g a Pubh'c Employee
In M'ller v. City of Mssi'on, 142 a newly elected mayor fired the plaintiff,
an assistant police chief and member of the police force for over fifteen years,
on the grounds that the plaintiff was responsible for the low morale and high
turnover in the police department. 1 3 At the time of his termination plain-
tiff was informed that he was entitled to a hearing, but was not in fact pro-
vided a pretermination hearing. 144 Nine days later, the plaintiff received a
letter from the mayor informing plaintiff of his right to a public hearing and
listing seven reasons for his termination. 145 Miller was eventually granted a
post-termination hearing, at which a list of additional, previously undis-
closed reasons for termination were presented. 146 Following the hearing the
mayor refused to reinstate Miller who then sought, unsuccessfully, law en-
forcement employment in several nearby cities as well as local employment
unrelated to police work. 14 7 Miller subsequently brought suit against the
city, the mayor, and several city council members under section 1983 claim-
ing that the termination of his employment as assistant police chief had de-
prived him of liberty and property interests without due process of law.148
In a pretrial hearing the district court ruled that the discharge proce-
dure had unconstitutionally deprived Miller of a property interest unless the
city could show that the failure to provide a pretermination hearing was
based on extraordinary circumstances, existing at the time of termination,
which justified denial of a hearing. 149 After trial, the court found that no
such circumstances existed.15°
The district court also determined, on a motion for summary judgment,
that the hearing officer presiding over the termination hearing was biased,
138. Id The grievance procedure did not allow a prisoner to recover for items not listed in
the prisoner's "property book"; it was the use of this conclusive presumption that was poten-
tially unconstitutional. Id (citing \:landis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)).
139. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1983).
140. 697 F.2d at 1351.
141. Id
142. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983).





148. Id at 370.
149. Id. at 371.
150. Id at 372.
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thereby denying the plaintiff due process. 1 ' In addition to the violations of
due process found by the court, the jury found that the plaintiff had been
deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law.
152
On appeal, the defendants contended that the district court erred in
holding that the hearing was defective, 153 that the evidence did not support
the conclusion that the plaintiffs liberty interests were denied, 154 and that
the city council members were not liable for plaintiff's injuries. 155 The
Tenth Circuit rejected these contentions.
1. Pretermination Hearing Requirements
The Tenth Circuit held that the hearing actually accorded petitioner
violated due process in three ways. First, due process requires an impartial
tribunal and pre-hearing notice of the charges which will be asserted at the
hearing. 156 Because the plaintiff first learned of many of the reasons for his
dismissal at the hearing itself, due process was violated. 15 7 Second, absent
the presence of an emergency, only a pretermination hearing satisfies due
process.' 58 Because no emergency existed justifying the failure to provide
plaintiff a pretermination hearing, due process was violated.' 5 9 Finally, the
court rejected the defendants' argument that the Rule of Necessity rendered
the hearing adequate, even though the hearing officer may have been
prejudiced. 60 Under the Rule of Necessity, due process is not violated when
a tribunal has an interest in the matter to be decided if the matter cannot
otherwise be heard. 16' The court of appeals found that the defendants' evi-
dence did not demonstrate the unavailability of an unprejudiced hearing
officer. 16 2 Thus, the Rule of Necessity was irrelevant, and due process was
violated by use of a biased hearing officer.
16 3
2. Deprivation of Public Employee's Liberty Interest
A public employee's liberty interest is deprived without due process of
law when the manner of termination either stigmatizes the employee or fore-
closes comparable employment opportunities. 164 In Miler, the irregularity
of the termination proceedings 165 failed to provide plaintiff the fair hearing
necessary to protect his liberty interests.' 66 Further, the mayor responsible
151. Id
152. Id at 372-73.
153. Id at 372.
154. Id at 373.
155. Id at 374.
156. Id at 372 (citing Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 907
(1977)).
157. 705 F.2d at 372.
158. Id (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)).
159. 705 F.2d at 372.
160. Id
161. Id (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980)).
162. 705 F.2d at 372.
163. Id.
164. Id at 373.
165. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
166. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
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for the termination extensively publicized both the fact of termination and
the reasons therefore.16 7 Plaintiffs inability to obtain similar employment
could reasonably be traced to the defendants' due process violations.' 68 The
court therefore upheld the jury's conclusion that plaintiffs liberty interests
had been violated. 1
69
3. Immunity for City Council Members
Several defendants also appealed on the grounds that their actions as
city council members had not deprived Miller of property without due pro-
cess, and that they could not be individually liable because of their qualified
immunity.' 70 The court held that even if these defendant's had not initiated
the unconstitutional termination proceedings, they had both ratified the de-
cision to proceed and failed to take steps to prevent unconstitutional ac-
tion. 17 1 Accordingly, they were responsible for the injuries caused by the
municipality's actions.1 72 Further, the city council officials had not acted
pursuant to a good faith, reasonable belief that the termination proceedings
were constitutional. 73 Hence, they were not entitled to immunity from per-
sonal liability. 1
74
IV. STATE ACTION THROUGH NOMINALLY PRIVATE PERSONS
This section examines the extent to which a private entity must inter-
face with the government in order for seemingly private actions to constitute
state action for the purpose of section 1983 liability.
A. Prvate School Discipline as State Action
In Milonas v. Williams 175 former students of the Provo Canyon School
for Boys brought a class action alleging that their constitutional rights had
been violated by the school's use of a behavior-modification program which
administered polygraph tests, monitored and censored students' mail, used
isolation rooms, and used excessive physical force. 1 76 The district court
found that the school's behavior modification program was carried out
"under the cloak of state action."' 77 This conclusion was based on the fact
that various state agencies charged with supervision over juveniles sent stu-
167. 705 F.2d at 373.
168. Id at 374.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 374-75.
172. Id at 375 (citing McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1979)).
173. Id at 375-76. The court noted that the defendants' conduct violated well established
principles of constitutional law, and that therefore they could not have had a reasonable belief
in the propriety of their actions. Id at 375 n.6. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982)).
174. 705 F.2d at 376. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)(discussing personal liability of municipal officers).
175. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1524 (1983).
176. Id at 934. The school's behavior modification program allegedly involved cruel and
unusual punishment and denied plaintiffs' right to due process of law. Id.
177. Id. at 939.
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
dents to the school, the fact that the school received significant state funding,
and the extensive state regulation of the school. 178 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's conclusion that the owners and operators of the
Provo Canyon School were acting under color of state law.1
79
The Tenth Circuit stated that the essential inquiry in determining when
private action is action under color of state law is "whether the alleged in-
fringement of Federal rights is fairly attributable to the state."' 80 The court
held that the extensive state involvement in funding the school, the knowing
acquiesence of state agencies in Provo Canyon's use of the behavior modifi-
cation program, and the state practice of mandating attendance at the
school rendered the behavior modification program action under color of
state law.' 8 ' In reaching its decision the court distinguished Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn,' 82 a Supreme Court decision holding that state funding and regula-
tion of a private school were insufficient, in and of themselves, to support a
finding of action under color of state law when the school discharged em-
ployees.' 8 3 In Rendell-Baker, the parties bringing the section 1983 action
were discharged employees, not students. 184 The Supreme Court observed
that because the state regulations did not compel or influence the decision to
discharge the employees, 185 the school's action could not fairly be character-
ized as state action. 186 Thus, although state funding and regulation were
not enough to create state action, the Tenth Circuit held that because the
state agencies had approved of the practices challenged in Mionas, and had
sent students to the school knowing they would be subjected to the chal-
lenged practices, use of the practices constituted state action.1
87
B. Determhzing When a State Actor's Actions are "State Action"
Gi/more v. Salt Lake Communzy Action Program 188 arose when Gilmore was
terminated from his position as Fiscal Director of the Salt Lake Community
Action Program (SLCAP).' 89 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that his termi-
nation involved state and federal action depriving him of a property interest
without due process of law. 90 Gilmore asserted that because SLCAP was a
state organized "community action agency" funded and regulated by Con-
178. Id. at 940.
179. Id at 941.
180. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).
181. 691 F.2d at 940.
182. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
183. Id. at 840-41.
184. Id at 830.
185. Id at 841.
186. Id. at 842. See also id. at 838 n.6.
187. 691 F.2d at 940. The First Circuit, in Rendell-Baker, had observed that students placed
in the private school by state agencies "would have a stronger argument than do plaintiffs that
the school's action towards Men is taken 'under color of' state law, since the school derives its
authority over them from the state." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1981),
affd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)(emphasis in original).
188. 710 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1983).
189. See id at 632-33.
190. Id at 633.
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gress' 9 1 its actions necessarily involved state and federal action. 192
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that no federal
action was present by likening federal involvement in Gilmore's firing to the
state involvement in Rendell-Baker.'93 Thus, although there was extensive
federal funding and regulation of SLCAP, the lack of federal involvement in
SLCAP's personnel policies and decisions precluded a finding of federal
action. 1
94
The court also held that Gilmore's termination did not involve state
action. 195 This decision was reached after applying the two-part test for
state action articulated in Lugar v. Edmondson O1l Co. ,196 a recent Supreme
Court opinion. Under Lugar, state action is present when the alleged uncon-
stitutional conduct results from a rule, policy, or decision attributable to the
state, and when the defendant is a person who may be fairly characterized as
a state actor. 19 7 The court found that although SLCAP was a state actor,19 8
there were no allegations that its personnel policies or decisions reflected or
embodied state policies or objectives.' 99 Thus, although SCLAP was a state
actor, the decision to terminate Gilmore did not involve state action20 0 and
accordingly could not be the subject of a section 1983 action.
V. LIMITING PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DURING PERFORMANCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS
In Coleman v. Turpen,201 the Tenth Circuit heard a case which deter-
mined whether a plaintiff, who was deprived of property by a private party,
could maintain an action under section 1983. In connection with Coleman's
arrest, the Oklahoma City Sheriffs Department had seized Coleman's truck
and camper worth $8,000, some tools worth $500, and $210 cash. 20 2 After
seizing Coleman, the Sheriff's Department hired a private wrecker to tow
and store the camper.20 3 The company subsequently presented the Sheriffs
Department with a substantial bill for storing the vehicle.
20 4
191. SLCAP was organized under the aegis of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2837 (1976) (repealed 1981). 710 F.2d at 634.
192. See 710 F.2d at 635.
193. Id at 636.
194. Id
195. Id at 639.
196. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
197. Id at 937.
198. See 710 F.2d at 637. The court found that SLCAP was a state actor because the state
was responsible for SLCAP's existence, and because many of SLCAP directors were public offi-
cials. Id Gilmore indicates that the mere presence of public officials in a policymaking position
may be sufficient to render an agency a state actor. See id. at 637 n.12.
199. Id at 638-39.
200. Id. at 638. The Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized the apparent paradox of finding
that the actions of a state actor were not "state action," but reasoned that a state should not be
charged with responsibility for all actions taken by independent (i.e. nominally private) state
actors. See id. at 638 n.13. The court recognized, however, that actions taken by state officials
under state authority are undeniably "state action." Id.
201. 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1983).
202. Id at 1343. The ultimate disposition of the tools was unclear, see id.; for the purpose of





Coleman was convicted of murder and received a death sentence. 20 5
None of the seized property, with the possible execption of the cash, 20 6 was
used at Coleman's trial.20 7 After his conviction, Coleman tried to recover his
property and learned that his camper had been sold, with police permission,
to cover the storage bill. 208 The authorities also refused to return the cash,
alleging that they had a statutory duty to retain all evidence used at Cole-
man's trial until the death penalty was exacted. 20 9 Coleman then brought a
section 1983 action against the sheriff, the public prosecutor, and the wreck-
er service. 2 l0 The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous and also found
that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from Coleman's suit, and that
the sheriff was immune because of his statutory duty to retain the evi-
dence.2 1' Additionally, the district court held that the private wrecker was
not acting under "color of state law" when it sold the camper, and that
therefore that action could not subject any of the defendants to liability
under section 1983.212
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined the alleged deprivation of cash
separately from the deprivation of the camper and tools, in order to deline-
ate the contours of the asserted due process violations and the asserted im-
munity defenses.
2 13
A. Immunity for Retention of .Possible Evidence
As noted, the prosecutor and sheriff claimed to be keeping the cash in
accordance with an Oklahoma statute.21 4 Coleman alleged, however, that
the money was not used as evidence in his trial.2 15 The court of appeals held
that because Coleman was not given an opportunity to show that the money
was not used as evidence at trial, and therefore was not subject to retention
under Oklahoma law, he had stated a claim of deprivation of his property
without due process. 2 16 Thus, the trial court had erred in ruling that Cole-
man's section 1983 claim was frivolous with respect to the retained cash.
21 7
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the public
prosecutor was absolutely immune for his role in keeping the cash. 2t 8 The
205. Id
206. See id at 1344.
207. Id at 1343.
208. Id
209. Id The prosecutor and sheriff claimed to be acting pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 1327(1981 & Supp. 1983), which requires retention of all exhibits in capital cases until the
death penalty has been carried out. See id § 1327(A).
210. 697 F.2d at 1343.
211. Id
212. Id
213. See id See also infra notes 214-33 and accompanying text.
214. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1327 (1981 & Supp. 1983). See supra note 210.
215. 697 F.2d at 1344.
216. Id
217. Id
218. Id The Tenth Circuit found that absolute immunity was required by Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), which confers absolute immunity on a public prosecutor for his
conduct in "initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state's case." Id at 431. The court
found that retention of possible evidence was part of the prosecutor's presentation of his case.
697 F.2d at 1344.
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court, however, rejected the categorical grant of immunity for the sheriff.
The sheriff was only entitled to immunity if he did not know or could not
reasonably have known that he was depriving Coleman of his constitutional
rights. 2 19 Because Coleman claimed that his money was not introduced as
evidence, the Oklahoma statute might not have been applicable. If the trial
court found that Coleman's claim was true, it would be required to consider
the sheriffs conduct to determine whether qualified immunity was avail-
able.220 Hence, the trial court had improperly granted immunity to the
sheriff.
2 21
B. Immunity for Admnistrative Dsposition of Prisoner's Property
Before reaching this immunity issue, the Tenth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's finding that the private wrecker service's sale of the camper and
tools was not action under color of state law.2 22 The court once again relied
heavily on Lugar's two-part test 2 2 3 for ascertaining the presence of state ac-
tion. 224 The court of appeals held that by enacting a statute225 which al-
lowed a good faith purchaser of the truck and camper to take them free of
Coleman's claims, Oklahoma had created the right to sell the truck exercised
by the wrecker service. 226 This satisfied the first prong of the Lugar test.
2 27
With respect to the second prong, because the state expressly permitted the
wrecker service to hold and sell the camper, the state had jointly partici-
pated with the private wrecker service in depriving Coleman of his property,
rendering the sale action by a state actor.2 28 Further, because Coleman had
not received notice of the sale, and because there was no exigency precluding
a predeprivation hearing, Coleman had stated a claim of unconstitutional
state action.
229
With respect to the immunity issue, the court of appeals found that the
prosecutor, in participating in the disposition of property which was not
used as evidence, had been acting in an administrative capacity and not as
an advocate. 230 Therefore, the prosecutor had only a qualified immunity,
which would shield him from liability only if he neither knew or should have
known that the sale violated Coleman's constitutional rights. 23 1 As with the
money, the sheriff enjoyed only a qualified immunity.
232
219. 697 F.2d at 1344 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-20 (1982)).
220. 697 F.2d at 1344.
221. See id. at 1347.
222. Id at 1345.
223. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
224. See 697 F.2d at 1345.
225. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 7-210 (1981).
226. 697 F.2d at 1345.
227. Id. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
228. 697 F.2d at 1345. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
229. 697 F.2d at 1345 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)).
230. 697 F.2d at 1346.
231. Id The Tenth Circuit's decision resolved a question left open by Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976), where the Supreme Court distinguished between a prosecutor's roles as
advocate and as administrator or investigator, but did not decide whether that difference justi-
fied different levels of immunity. Id at 430-31.
232. 697 F.2d at 1347.
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VI. PRISONER'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Standards for Section 1983 Actions Involving Violence to Pretrial Detainees
Smith v. Iron County 233 established the proposition that a prison guard's
use of force against a prisoner is not always a constitutional violation. The
plaintiff was a detainee-prisoner who was awaiting disposition of a burglary
charge.2 34 During the detention the jailer, who was on duty alone, heard a
loud noise coming from the vicinity of plaintiff's cell. 235 The jailer saw the
plaintiff on the floor under a bunk and, after inquiring what plaintiff was
doing and providing plaintiff several opportunities to cooperate, sprayed the
plaintiff with mace. 236 The jailer later recovered a six-pound iron drain
cover with a jagged edge, which the plaintiff was allegedly using to dig
through the cell wall.237 After the incident, the plaintiff brought suit under
section 1983 alleging that the macing incident constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment, 238 and constituted a dep-
rivation of liberty in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 239 The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the undis-
puted facts did not support the conclusion that the defendant's conduct con-
stituted a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
240
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 24' Prior to
considering the merits, however, the court reaffirmed its statement in Little-
field v. De/and242 that a pretrial detainee's claim of unconstitutional punish-
ment is to be evaulated through a due process analysis, rather than an
analysis focusing on the "cruel and unusual" nature of the punishment.
2 43
Under the due process analysis, unconstitutional action is present when a
jailer uses unreasonable force, or when a jailer uses force maliciously.
244
Turning to the merits, the court noted that in most circumstances the
use of mace would constitute excessive force giving rise to a valid section
1983 claim. 245 The court held, however, that the particular circumstances
surrounding this macing incident-the jailer was on duty alone, there had
been previous trouble with the plaintiff, there were two prisoners in the cell
with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had a dangerous object-were sufficient
to prevent the guard's use of mace from violating the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.
2 46
233. 692 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1982).
234. Id at 685.
235. Id.
236. d. at 686.
237. Id
238. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. This amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" shall not be inflicted. Id
239. 692 F.2d at 686.
240. See id at 685.
241. Id at 688.
242. 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981).
243. 692 F.2d at 687.
244. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Em-
ployee-Offlcer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
245. 692 F.2d at 686.
246. Id. at 687.
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B. Standards for Prisoner Section 1983 Actions Claiming Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
In Sampley v. Ruettgers24 7 two inmates at the Wyoming State Peniten-
tiary alleged they were beaten by a guard who was giving them haircuts.
248
Plaintiff Sampley alleged that a guard, without provocation, grabbed him
by the throat, strangled him, slammed his head against a steel window, and
then struck him several times with barber clippers, leaving an inch deep
cut.
2 4 9 The guard was then alleged to have cut Sampley's hair, spit on the
hair clippers, pushed plaintiff Martinez, and cut Martinez' hair without
washing the saliva from the clippers.2 50 The plaintiffs claimed in their sec-
tion 1983 actions that the prison guard's conduct subjected them to cruel
and unusual punishment and deprived them of liberty without due pro-
cess. 2 5 1 An internal prison investigation concluded that no unnecessary
force was used against the plaintiffs. 2 52 The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on the basis of the prison report, despite the submission of conflicting
pleadings and affidavits by plaintiffs.
253
The circuit court treated the trial court's dismissal as a summary judg-
ment for the defendants, thus requiring construction of the pleadings and
affidavits in the plaintiffs' favor. 254 With this review posture, the court re-
versed the district court as to Sampley, but affirmed as to Martinez. 255 In
reversing the district court's ruling on Sampley's complaint, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on Estelle v. Gamble256 and held that a "prison guard's unauthor-
ized beating of an inmate can violate the eighth amendment. '257 The court
stated, however, that a prison guard's use of force against an inmate is cruel
and unusual only if it involved "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." 258 This standard required that a section 1983 claim alleging an
eighth amendment violation include three elements. 259 First, the complaint
must allege wanton conduct, which is shown by an intention to harm the
inmate. 2 6 0 Second, the complaint must allege unnecessary conduct, which is
the use of force exceeding that which appeared reasonably necessary, in the
circumstances, to maintain or restore discipline. 26 ' Third, the inmate must
have suffered pain exceeding momentary discomfort; the guard's attack must
result in either severe pain or a lasting injury.
262
247. 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983).





253. Id The Tenth Circuit noted that reliance on the prison report was improper because
administrative findings could not be permitted to usurp the court's factfinding obligation. Id at
493 n.3.
254. Id. at 493 n.2.
255. Id at 496.
256. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
257. 704 F.2d at 495.
258. Id (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).






The circuit court found that Sampley's complaint satisfied these three
requirements and, because disputed issues of fact remained, reversed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the complaint. 263 The court held that Martinez,
although he may have had state tort actions against the guard, had not
stated a claim of cruel or unusual punishment under the Sampley test, and
also held that the guard's conduct had not deprived Martinez of liberty.
264
Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of Martinez' complaint was
affirmed.
265
VII. PROPRIETY OF AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES
In Lancaster v. Roarguez2 6 6 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a nominal damage award is appropriate under section 1983 when a
plaintiff proves a violation of his rights but is unable to prove actual in-
jury.267 Lancaster sought actual damages for violation of his eighth amend-
ment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.2 68 The trial court
found that there was an eighth amendment violation without actual injury
and, relying on the Supreme Court's Care v. PzihUS 2 6 9 decision, awarded
only nominal damages.
270
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that
damage awards in section 1983 actions are governed by the principle of com-
pensation.2 7 ' The circuit court refused to distinguish ipthus, which involved
a procedural deficiency,2 72 from Lancaster's substantive constitutional
claim, stating that when no damages were shown to have resulted from the
constitutional claim, the nature of the violation was insignificant.
2 73
VIII. MAXIMUM AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SECTION 1983
ACTION
The civil rights attorney's fees statute 274 provides that in the enforce-
ment of a section 1983 action, the court, in its discretion, may award reason-
able attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 275 In Cooper v. Snger,2 76 the
district court denied the plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees, despite their
263. Id at 496.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 701 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3121 (1983).
267. Id at 864.
268. Id.
269. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
270. 701 F.2d at 864.
271. Id In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court recognized that compensation
principles, which generally control the award of damages in the American legal system, were
applicable to section 1983 actions. See id at 254-57. See generally Note, Damage Awardsfor Consti-
tutional Torts: A Reconsideration Afier Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980).
272. See 435 U.S. at 248.
273. 701 F.2d at 866.
274. 42 US.C. § 1988 (Supp. V. 1981). This statute provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n
any action . . . to enforce a provision of [section 1983] . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs." Id
275. See id
276. 689 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1983).
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successful section 1983 action, because plaintiffs had a contingent fee agree-
ment with their counsel. 277 The district court stated that the contingent fee
arrangement made any award of attorney's fees unnecessary, because the
arrangement fulfilled the purpose of the civil rights attorney's fees statute,
which was to encourage plaintiffs to vindicate their civil rights by ensuring
compensation for attorneys.2 78 Any award in excess of the contingent fee
would be an unnecessary "windfall" for the attorney.
279
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. 280 Stating that the dis-
cretion allowed in awarding fees under the attorney's fees statute is ex-
tremely narrow, the court held that fees could be denied only when "special
circumstances" were present. 281  Under this rule, a prevailing party will re-
cover attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust. ' 28 2 The court then held that the existence of a contingent fee
arrangement does not itself constitute a "special circumstance" precluding
an award of attorney's fees.283 Rather, the contingency arrangement or any
other contractually stipulated amount would be treated as the maximum fee
permitted in the case, with attorney's fees awards used to harmonize the
agreed on figure with the amount actually obtained through judgment.
28 4
In a well-reasoned partial dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the
majority's ruling that a fee arrangement establishes the maximum allowable
fee. 2 8 5 Judge Holloway argued that neither the statute nor its history called
for such a limitation.28 6 The judge urged that the statute required the court
to grant a fee sufficient to attract competent counsel, with that determina-
tion to be made on an objective basis, rather than by reference to the plain-
tiff's agreement with the lawyer.
28 7
Lenore A. Martinez
277. Id. at 932.
278. Id. at 931.
279. Id
280. Id. at 932.
281. Id at 931 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
282. See 689 F.2d at 931.
283. Id
284. Id. at 932. The court noted that the district court could benefit a plaintiff by setting off
the contingent fees amount through an award of statutory attorney's fees. Id
285. Id (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Id.
287. Id at 934. Judge Holloway noted that lawyers may frequently accept low con-
tingency fees for worthy reasons. Id.
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